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Abstract
My project aims to develop a relational, pluralistic political theory that moves us
beyond liberal democracy, and to consider how such a theory translates into our
public school settings. In this essay I argue that Dewey offers us possibilities for
moving beyond one key assumption of classical liberalism, individualism, with
his theory of social transaction. I focus my discussion for this paper on Dewey’s
renascent liberal democracy. I move from a discussion of Dewey’s liberal democratic theory to what a relational, pluralistic democratic theory might look like,
with Dewey’s help.

Introduction
The United States was founded on a concept of democracy that has its philosophical roots in the Euro-western classical liberal theory of Locke (1823/1960)) and
Rousseau (1762/1968). For classical liberal political philosophers such as Locke and
Rousseau, the role of government/the state is to protect individuals from others, and
otherwise to stay out of individuals’ lives and allow them to live as they freely choose.
The goal of liberalism is to secure opportunities for individuals to realize their full
potentials. Classical liberal democracy emphasizes a negative view of freedom as
“freedom from.” “Freedom from” focuses on individual rights as natural rights and
emphasizes the need to protect these natural rights, for they belong to individuals
prior to the formation of political governments and social relations. It is an argument for the primacy of the individual over the state. Such a view of democracy
is based on a strong assumption of individualism that treats individuals as if they
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develop atomistically on their own. It is also based on a strong assumption of rationalism, on freed intelligence, that individuals can learn to think for themselves and
use their reasoning capacity to critique their government’s actions and change the
government if it is not meeting their individual needs. Liberal democratic theories,
even in their more recent forms, such as Dewey’s (1935) renascent liberal democracy,
or their current forms, such as Rorty’s (1998) social hope, are vulnerable to criticisms that they continue to focus on individual freedom and autonomy. They are
also vulnerable to charges that they continue to count on an Enlightenment-type
of rationalism as its method of critique, even in Dewey’s (1916/1996) more recent
form as the scientiﬁc method, in Habermas’s (1984) form as ideal speech acts, or
in Rawls’s (1993) form as the veil of ignorance. I want to address the vulnerability
of these charges in the case of Dewey.
Great changes have occurred in political philosophy and in societies at large
since Dewey was writing. We live in times that Nancy Fraser (1997) describes as
“postsocialist.” Today key underlying assumptions of liberal democratic theory
are being questioned and dismissed. Enlightenment rationalism and the idea of a
unitary subject have come under serious criticism by postmodernists, feminists,
and critical theorists. Surprising, given the time that has passed since Dewey was
writing, I ﬁnd Dewey is still a key source to help us ﬁnd our way out of liberal
democracy’s assumptions and show us how to move on. I will argue that Dewey
offers us possibilities of moving beyond individualism with his theory of social
transaction (Dewey, 1949/1960); I have argued elsewhere that he shows us how to
move beyond Enlightenment rationalism in his arguments for truths as warranted
assertions (Dewey, 1938/1955; Thayer-Bacon, 2003).
I want to follow Dewey’s social transactional lead and describe our world as
one that is pluralistic, relational, and in process as we continually contribute to the
ongoing constructing of knowing. I want to address Iris Young’s (1990) concerns
for more emphasis on differences, and to emphasize social differences as resources,
without at the same time falling into the trap Young does of embracing a wholesale,
undifferentiated and uncritical version of politics of difference. Like Chantal Mouffe
(1993) I don’t want to embrace extreme pluralism that emphasizes heterogeneity and
incommensurability, which leads us to what I (2003) call naïve relativism. Instead
I want to argue that certain differences should be challenged and even eliminated
(such as extreme levels of classism) while other differences should be enjoyed, similar to Fraser (1997). We need a differentiated politics of difference that represents
a more qualiﬁed relativist view of truths, moving further in the direction Dewey
(1938/1955) pointed to in Logic. Such a view argues that we make decisions based
on the best criteria and standards we can agree upon, with the full understanding
that our agreed-upon criteria and standards are fallible and subject to change. Our
criteria and standards must be submitted to continual critique and reevaluation,
even criteria that we cherish such as individuality and freedom.
I focus my discussion for this paper on John Dewey’s renascent liberal democracy. I do so for several reasons. Dewey’s work has strongly inﬂuenced cur-
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rent democratic theories, such as Benjamin Barber’s (1984) strong democracy, as
well as Judith Green’s (1999) deep democracy. Even more importantly, Dewey has
inﬂuenced my own theory, for I think he offers me a direction for how to move
beyond liberal democracy’s assumption of individualism. Dewey presents a nice
summation of liberal democratic theoretical assumptions and their pros and cons
in Liberalism and Social Action (1935), which is why I will turn to it as a start.1 I
will also consider two other key political works about democracy, The Public and
Its Problems (1927) and Freedom and Culture (1939).2 After a discussion of Dewey’s
liberal democratic theory I will turn to a discussion of what a relational, pluralistic
democratic theory might look like.

Renascent Liberal Democracy
John Dewey recognizes we start out as members of communities, in associated
living, and that our ﬁrst community is our family, where we are nurtured, and
we experience face-to-face relationships. He (1916/1996) begins his classic work
Democracy and Education with a discussion of social communities, and how individuals develop out of those communities. In many of his writings we can ﬁnd
Dewey discussing infants and their relationships to their mothers as well as their
extended families. Unlike classical liberal philosophers, Dewey does not treat individuals as if they sprout out of the ground already fully developed. He never seems
to lose sight of the fact that we all begin our lives in someone else’s loving arms.
Dewey developed a sense of self that begins in relation with others, a social self
that develops and grows to become more autonomous and rational as we continue
to interact with others. Many have written about the inﬂuence his friend and colleague George H. Mead, a philosopher and sociologist, had on his social concept
of self (e.g., Garrison 1995).
It is not until late in Dewey’s career, in his work co-authored with Arthur
Bentley (1949/1960), Knowing and the Known, that he introduces the term transaction, but one can ﬁnd the seeds for this idea in many of his earlier writings, including
Democracy and Education. Earlier Dewey used the term “interaction” to describe
relationships that affect each other, but later he amended the term to “transaction”
because he realized that things can interact with each other without necessarily
affecting the individuals in signiﬁcant ways, like billiard balls that hit each other
on a pool table and bounce off of each other but still maintain their original form.
For Dewey, selves interact with others such that both are changed as a result, and
thus their relationship is more accurately described as a “transaction.” Communities help to shape the individual into who s/he becomes, but individual selves, as
immature young members of the community, help to shape and change the community as well, due to their immaturity, which allows them to be ﬂexible, open,
adaptive, and growing.
Dewey’s concept of democracy as a mode of associated living, much broader
than any particular view of political democracy, as well as his concept of transaction are cornerstone ideas for the relational view of democracy I want to describe.
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What is interesting to me is an examination of how much Dewey allowed or did
not allow his key idea of transaction to shape his own social and political view of
democracy, for his view of democracy was both a social and political view, and the
two cannot be separated, as it is our forms of social relations that affect our political relations. In order for me to explore how Dewey’s concept of transaction did or
did not affect his own view of democracy, I turn to the three key later works of his
I named above. I begin with Liberalism and Social Action, as I think Dewey offers
an excellent analysis of classical liberal political theory and its further developments in this text.
Liberalism and Social Action
Liberalism and Social Action is a publication of Dewey’s Page-Barbour Lectures delivered at the University of Virginia and published in 1935. In this series of lectures
he begins by laying out the history of liberalism, as he seeks to ﬁnd what permanent
value liberalism contains and how these values can be maintained in today’s world
(the 1930s). In typical Deweyan style, his method of philosophical argumentation is
a historical approach. After pointing to the fact that liberalism can be traced back to
ancient Greece and the idea of “free play of intelligence,” Dewey begins his historical
analysis in earnest with John Locke, in 1688, and his vision that governments exist
to protect the rights of individuals. He shows us how Locke’s philosophy focuses on
the individual, where individualism is opposed to organized social order. For Locke
there is a natural opposition between an individual and organized society. Locke
was seeking to ﬁnd a way to get out from under the constraints of society that had
developed by his lifetime. He solved this problem by beginning with an assumption
that individuals develop on their own, as self-made men, and have the freedom to
decide whether or not to join up with others to form a society. The decision to join
up with others is always at the expense of the individual’s freedom. Locke described
democratic governments as offering individuals the service of safeguard and protection, to ensure their individual rights are honored and to make sure that others do not harm them. However, this is always a precarious governmental service
that must be kept in check to make sure that the government does not infringe on
our individual rights any more than is necessary to protect us. The relationship
between individuals and the government is one of distrust and suspicion; it is one
where the individual must always be on the watch to make sure the government is
powerful enough to protect individual rights, but not so powerful that it takes away
individual rights. Key values of Locke’s classical liberalism are that every individual
has the right to “the full development of his capacities” and that liberty is “the most
precious trait and very seal of individuality” (Dewey, 1935, p. 24).
Dewey’s insightful criticism of early liberalism is that it assumes a conception
of individuality “as something ready-made, already possessed, and needing only
the removal of certain legal restrictions to come into full play” (p. 39). Dewey tells
us the “Achilles heel of early liberalism” is the idea of separate individuals, “each
of whom is bent on personal private advantage” (p. 54). Early liberalism did not
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conceive of individualism “as a moving thing, something that is attained only by
continuous growth” (p. 39). Dewey offers us his description of the individual as not
starting out in a state of nature prior to entering a social state, but rather as human
infants connected to and cared for by family members. He warns: “If liberalism is
concerned with the importance of individuality, it must be deeply concerned with
the structure of human association, for the latter positively and negatively affects
the development of individuals” (p. 41). From Dewey’s criticism of early liberalism,
we can see that it is clearly the case that Dewey did not begin his own democratic
theory with an assumption of atomistic individualism.
Apparently Locke was not able to see social arrangements as positive forces,
instead of just as external limitations. According to Dewey (1935), it is not until
the second half of the nineteenth century that the idea arises that the state should
be instrumental in securing and extending the liberties of individuals (pp. 5–6).
Slowly we see a shift from the idea of using government action only for protection
and safeguarding to arguing that we can use governmental action to aid those who
are economically disadvantaged, to alleviate their condition. During the nineteenth
century there is a movement in liberal thinking from seeing society as only a hindrance to individuals to beginning to see society as offering assistance and help
toward individual development. During the second half of the nineteenth century
in American history we ﬁnd arguments for the value of public education for children whose parents cannot afford to give their children private education. Horace
Mann and others suggest that the government (federal and state) should pay for
public education out of public funds raised through individual taxes. Today in political discussions in the United States, Libertarians and conservative Republicans
represent the early classical liberal’s view of democracy as one where the least government is the best, and Democrats and moderate Republicans represent the new
liberals of the nineteenth century, who are committed to using society and the state
to help individuals develop to their full capacity.
Dewey (1935) recognizes the important battles that were won by early liberalism in terms of freedom of thought, conscience, expression, and communication.
These qualities are what he sees as essential for us to have “freed intelligence.” For
Dewey, the enduring values of early liberalism are “liberty; the development of the
inherent capacities of individuals made possible through liberty, and the central
role of free intelligence in inquiry, discussion and expression” (p. 32). However,
Dewey does not regard “intelligence as an individual possession and its exercise as
an individual right,” as classical liberalism does (p. 65). Intelligence depends on “a
social organization that will make possible effective liberty and opportunity for
personal growth in mind and spirit for all individuals” (pp. 56–57). Again we ﬁnd
evidence that Dewey does not rely on an atomistic view of individualism.
Freed intelligence is a social method that Dewey wants to be identiﬁed with
the scientiﬁc method of investigation. Importantly, because he describes freed intelligence as a social method of inquiry, he recognizes that intelligence is not a readymade possession; it must be secured. He is very aware that oppressions in terms of
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slavery, serfdom, and material insecurity are harmful to freed intelligence. He gave
the Page-Barbour Lectures during the Great Depression, and he was worried about
fascism and communism at the time. Dewey argues for a “renascent liberalism”
that recognizes that democracies must establish material security as a prerequisite
for individual freedom.
We do ﬁnd evidence that Dewey’s democratic theory relies on an assumption of rationalism in his concept of freed intelligence. Dewey trusted that the scientiﬁc method of inquiry would replace brute force as the method of cooperative
intelligence. He was greatly inﬂuenced by Darwin’s Origin of Species, as were other
classic pragmatists, such as Peirce and James, and he references Darwin’s contribution to scientiﬁc thinking in many of his writings, including Liberalism and Social
Action. In Democracy and Education, Dewey (1916/1996) emphasizes freed intelligence through his discussion of reﬂective thinking that begins in doubt, where
one is stirred to move to action, to generate possible hypotheses and test these out
in order to arrive at a conclusion that ends the doubt. Reﬂective thinking is the scientiﬁc method, which by 1935 Dewey describes as “freed intelligence.” Predictably,
he ends Liberalism and Social Action by pointing to education as the ﬁrst object of a
renascent liberalism, to aid in the producing of habits of mind and character that
are necessary for freed intelligence.
The Public and Its Problems
In Dewey’s (1927) The Public and Its Problems, which is based on lectures he gave
in 1926 at Kenyon College, Ohio, prior to the Great Depression, we ﬁnd Dewey
worrying about the problem of loss of a public, and how this loss affects democracies. Interestingly, he does not begin his talks by looking at political philosophy
and the public; he begins by looking at individuals. He wants to emphasize “that
all deliberative choices and plans are ﬁnally the work of single individuals” (p. 21).
However, just when we may think we have caught Dewey assuming individualism,
he goes on to criticize individualism and say that individuals exist and operate in
association. Again he talks about how we are born infants, “immature, helpless,
dependent upon the activities of others” (p. 24). What we believe is the outcome
of association and intercourse. For Dewey conjoint, combined, associated action
is a universal trait of the behavior of things. A society is individuals in their connections with one another, whereas a political state is a distinctive and secondary
form of association.
Dewey (1927) then turns to examining the democratic state, and as in Liberalism and Social Action, we ﬁnd he again takes a historical look at what formed
democracy. It was not theory that formed democracy but rather a convergence of a
great number of social movements. Again we are reminded of the fear of government
and the desire to reduce its power that motivated Locke. Dewey shows us again that
Locke took the route of individualism, “a theory which endows singular persons in
isolation from any associations,” “a doctrine of independence of any and all associations,” to diminish the government’s power (pp. 86–87). Locke’s route was to go
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back to the naked individual and sweep away all associations as foreign to his nature
and rights. Other forces that helped to contribute to this concept of individualism
(also discussed in Liberalism and Social Action) include Adam Smith’s laissez-faire
capitalism, the Mills’ (father and son) utilitarian economic theory, and science’s
development of machines (which today I think we would describe more generally
as Newton’s atomistic and mechanistic scientiﬁc description of the universe).
Dewey (1927) argues there was no need for Locke to take the individualism
route he took in order to limit the role of government. It would have been enough
to assert that some primary groupings have claims that the state should not legitimately encroach upon. These primary groupings include families and neighbors.
Our roots for democracy began in the false roots of atomistic individualism. Again,
Dewey shows how we start out our lives in association with others, with our earliest
associations being face-to-face interactions with families and neighbors. They are
our “chief agencies of nurturance” and they are “bred only in intimacy” (p. 211).
According to Dewey, “There is no substitute for the vitality and depth of close and
direct intercourse and attachment” (p. 213).
In The Public and Its Problems, Dewey (1927) discusses how in the United
States we are losing face-to-face interactions in the small community life and town
meetings that were the cornerstone of American democratic polity. He describes
the printing press, railways, telegraphs, mass manufacturing, and urban centers
(basically, the industrial revolution), as well as the large inﬂux of immigrants, as
leading to a loss of public. In 1926 he was worried that the American public was
becoming too large, too diffused and scattered, and too intricate in composition.
What is his solution to this problem of loss of the public and the apathy and indifference to democracy that it breeds? We come back to Dewey’s key idea that a democracy is a social idea as well as a system of government, and the second form of
democracy (political) depends on the ﬁrst (social). A democracy is shared interests
established through interaction; it is associated joint activity that is dependent on
community to exist. For Dewey, we are born in associations, but not necessarily in
communities. We have to initiate our young into communities by teaching them
our language and customs through education. For Dewey, democracy is an ideal
always in the making, never to be achieved, and so is community (pp. 148–149).
His solution to the problem of loss of a public is to restore our local communities,
for our local communities are the mediums for democracy: “Democracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighborly community” (p. 213). Dewey wants
communities restored that are alive and ﬂexible as well as stable, ones that “manifest a fullness, variety and freedom of possession and enjoyment of meanings and
goods,” ones that are responsive to the complex world in which we are enmeshed,
local but not isolated (p. 216).
Freedom and Culture
Dewey’s Freedom and Culture was published in 1939, during the outbreak of World
War II, when there was great fear as to whether or not democracy would survive.
Volume 22 (2) ♦ 2006

26

♦ Barbara Thayer-Bacon
This time Dewey decides to look at democracy in the United States and its development with the help of Jefferson, rather than Locke, since he argues that American
conditions are different from the British. He starts with a cultural focus (to gather
up the terms upon which human beings associate and live together), suggesting
we cannot isolate any one factor, such as the relations of industry, communication,
science, art, or religion. For Dewey, all of these are intrinsic parts of the culture
that affect politics, and no one factor is dominant over all others. Dewey criticizes
Marxism because it isolates one factor, economics, in its discussion of human associations. He tells us that the full conditions for a complete democratic experience have not existed yet.
Using his historical approach again, Dewey (1939) reminds us in Freedom
and Culture that America started with an economic focus (rebellion over taxation,
restrictions on industry and trade). As in The Public and Its Problems, again we ﬁnd
Dewey taking a romantic view of early theory and practice in the United States, presuming harmony between liberty and equality in farming times, and how this has
changed with industry. There is no discussion of women’s rights in this romantic
view, or the sexism that pervaded the United States prior to industrialization, and
there is next to no discussion of Native Americans and African Americans and the
overt racism that was so dominant during that time in American history. Again,
Dewey warns us that we are not going to have democracy until all our institutions
are run democratically (church, business, schools, family, law, government, etc.).
In Freedom and Culture, Dewey (1939) connects the future of democracy to
a spread of the scientiﬁc attitude, like his “freed intelligence” in Liberalism and Social Action. Here he argues that the scientiﬁc attitude is our sole guarantee against
widespread propaganda. Dewey recognizes that democracy needs free speech, free
press, free assembly, and an education system that encourages inquiry, a scientiﬁc
attitude. We can secure democracy with all the resources provided by collective
intelligence operating in cooperative action (p. 176). Dewey ends Freedom and Culture by returning to Jefferson to underscore that Jefferson was not afraid of change.
Jefferson referred to the American government as “an experiment.” Dewey wants
to encourage us to have the same attitude. As in The Public and Its Problems, he
again points to the need for face-to-face interaction, political organization in small
units, and the need for direct communication in order for democracy to thrive (p.
159). Again he recommends, “Democracy must begin at home, and its home is the
neighborhood community,” using a direct quote from The Public and Its Problems.
And again, as in Liberalism and Social Action, he recognizes the need for equalization of economic conditions so that free choice and free action can be maintained.
Dewey tells us democratic ends demand democratic methods. His central claim
is that “The struggle for democracy has to be maintained on as many fronts as
culture has aspects: political, economic, international, educational, scientiﬁc and
artistic, religious” (p. 173).
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A Relational, Pluralistic Democracy Always in the Making
I want to argue for a pluralistic, relational democratic theory that starts by letting go
of the assumptions of individualism, rationalism, and universalism, which form the
foundation for classical liberal democracy. Individualism has many problems with
it as a base for democracy, as we discovered with Dewey’s help from his lectures presented here. However, in letting go of individualism, a relational democratic theory
does not embrace communitarianism, which starts with the social community as
the base from which we derive individuals, thus placing individuals always within
the danger of social determinism. This was the problem for Mead (1934). Liberal
democracy and communitarianism seem to be logically exclusive of each other,
presenting themselves in a way where one must choose either one or the other. I
want to argue for a both/and logical approach that suggests we can learn from the
strengths and weaknesses of individualism and communitarianism in developing
a democratic theory that describes selves as multifarious selves-in-relation-withothers, including our natural world. Following Dewey’s lead, the democratic theory
I present here is based on a view of relations as transactional, where individuals
are inﬂuenced and affected by others but at the same time inﬂuence others; it is a
relationship that works both ways, and all are changed as a result.
This transactional relational view of democracy does not assume universality. It is located in the contingent, local everyday world of diverse people and their
values and beliefs. It is located in a world of speciﬁc material needs such as shelter,
food, jobs, healthcare and childcare, as well as social, psychological, and spiritual
needs. It seeks to address real people and their concerns in terms of their speciﬁcity
and situatedness, as well as in terms of their diversity and plurality. It does not seek
to homogenize and whitewash over distinctions and unique qualities, but at the
same time it aims to address people’s commonalities across their differences. This
relational democratic theory is not only pluralistic in terms of embracing cultural
diversity, it is also pluralistic in that it does not argue that there is one universal answer or truth upon which in the end of time we will all agree. Rather, it is a theory
that suggests there are many answers and truths and in the end we will still have a
variety of ways of explaining our world and our experiences, relying on a variety
of tools to help us in our descriptions. In the end of time, we will still be discussing and debating, meditating and chanting, singing and dancing, as we consider
new possibilities. This theory does not suggest that we can hope to solve all of our
problems by some special method, such as language analysis, historical analysis,
phenomenology, hermeneutics, or the scientiﬁc method with the use of an important tool such as reason or intuition. Instead, it recognizes that we use a variety of
tools to help us solve our problems and they all have important roles to play in our
inquiring processes. I am introducing a democratic theory always in the making
that is never complete or ﬁnished. Like Dewey’s democratic theory, which is a mode
of associated living, it is a comprehensive theory in that it argues for the need to
inform all kinds of social institutions in order to thrive. These social institutions
include our families, churches, workplaces, and schools, not just political forms of
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government, for all forms of social institutions exert power over individuals at the
same time that they generate power due to individual contributions.

Conclusion
What distinguishes the pluralistic, relational democratic theory I sketch in this
essay from Dewey’s liberal democracy are his assumptions of rationalism and universalism that still trail along in his renascent liberalism. We ﬁnd the assumption
of universalism in his romantic view of agrarian American society prior to the industrial revolution and the inﬂux of immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century. We also ﬁnd universalism in his romantic view of face-to-face interactions
in small communities prior to the industrial revolution and his recommendation
that we need to get back to face-to-face interactions through such methods as town
meetings. We discover his assumption of rationalism in his naive view of the scientiﬁc method as what will lead us beyond the powerful inﬂuence of culture and
our fears of social determinism and indoctrination.
A pluralistic, relational view of democracy insists that we need to look at
America’s past from the perspective of African Americans, Native Americans,
Mexican Americans (involuntary immigrants and conquered people indigenous
to this land), and women and children (viewed as property of males). America’s
wealth was built on the free, slave, and indentured labor of these people, without
them having recognized rights as citizens of this country until the twentieth and
twenty-ﬁrst centuries (children still are viewed as the property of their parents).
The radical view of democracy I am developing insists that we consider power issues involved in face-to-face interactions in small communities and the kinds of
homogenizing and silencing effects these communities have on diverse opinions
and perspectives. People from the dominant culture who acquired ﬂuency in the
dominant language and practiced oral skills and styles of relating valued by the
dominant culture are the ones whose voices were heard in those town meetings
Dewey and present day Barber want to go back to. People living in the communities who were not considered citizens were not allowed to attend the meetings, or
if they were allowed to attend they were seated in the balconies or the back and
were not allowed to speak.3
The view I offer in this essay also recognizes the limitations of the scientiﬁc
method and its biases and prejudices, which are disguised as neutral and universal,
relying on rationality and the valuing of reason. Science has been used to argue
racist and sexist biological deterministic views of inferiority for non-Anglos and
women. Due to feminist theory and critical theory, we now can recognize that even
science is embedded within paradigms that shift over time, and that what we take
to be neutral criteria, standards, and principles are negotiated and inﬂuenced by
the scientists doing the investigating (Harding, 1991; Haraway, 1988; Keller, 1985).
With the introduction of minorities and women’s views, we have exposed the limits
of reason and we now can recognize other valuable tools to help us in our inquiring,
including intuition, emotions, and imagination (Thayer-Bacon, 2000).
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By exploring Dewey’s discussion of classical liberalism, we gain a solid understanding of classical liberalism’s foundational beliefs as well as problems these
beliefs present for democratic theories. By considering Dewey’s renascent liberalism in contrast to classical liberalism, we uncover his powerful criticisms against
classical liberalism. We also learn the limits of Dewey’s ability to move beyond his
own embeddedness within a liberal culture and we discover his biases, which affected his own criticisms and recommended solutions. Now we are in a position to
be able to recognize Dewey’s inﬂuence on other current democratic theories, such
as Barber’s strong democracy, Green’s deep democracy, and my own relational, pluralistic democracy-always-in-the-making.

Notes
1. This means that I will not address the three works in exact chronological order in
terms of their writing, but this will not limit our understanding of Dewey’s key ideas, nor
will it keep us from seeing the development of his ideas.
2. As any author wanting to write about Dewey’s ideas knows, Dewey was a very proliﬁc
writer and wrote more on a chosen topic than a scholar can discuss in one small essay with
any success. There are even more possible writings to consider if one includes as sources secondary authors writing about Dewey’s ideas. I have chosen to limit my discussion to these
three key works, as they offer the most in-depth discussion of liberalism by Dewey that I am
aware of, and I have chosen to limit myself only to Dewey’s original writings to make sure
I have the room to carefully discuss his own work. I am aware that there is more to choose
from but recognize the impossibility of addressing it all, nor do I think that is necessary for
my purposes here. See the reference list for some other suggested readings on Dewey’s ideas
concerning liberalism.
3. One of my reviewers suggested that I do not give Dewey enough credit for his involvement in the women’s suffrage movement and his support as a founding member of the
NAACP. I don’t wish to deny that Dewey was active in ﬁghting social justice issues of his time.
I would add to the reviewer’s examples Dewey’s support for the Highlander Folk School, in
Tennessee, which helped to organize the southern labor movement and later the civil rights
movement. My criticism is with the lack of attention to racism and sexism in Dewey’s democratic theory, not his way of life. I am not the only one criticizing him on these issues. See
Frank Margonis’s and Charlene Haddock Seigfried’s contributions to this topic.
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